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There are several competing models for the estimation of investment at the
ﬁrm-level, and their application to economies of transition introduces a fur-
ther layer of complexity. The accelerator remains the simplest method and,
for data reasons, the most commonly applied in the transition literature. It
has been superseded elsewhere by more rigourous approaches, notably the
q and Euler equation models, which are based on the same problem of in-
tertemporal maximisation under convex costs of adjustment. However the
evidence for convex costs of adjustment is controversial, which is signiﬁcant
because neither of these approaches can incorporate non-convexities. Fur-
thermore the data requirements of both approaches are demanding, limiting
their applicability to transition economies where the data from ﬁnancial mar-
kets required for q models, and the large samples required for estimation of
Euler equations, are rare.
Abel and Eberly [1] show that for a model of intertemporal proﬁt maximi-
sation with non-convex costs of adjustment capacity utilisation is a suﬃcient
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1statistic for the presence of investment opportunities. We derive and imple-
ment a variety of Tobit estimation frameworks based on this model and ﬁnd
evidence to suggest that it outperforms a conventional accelerator model.
We also test whether problems of access to external ﬁnance are depressing
levels of investment in Poland and Romania, using Spain as a benchmark
for performance. This is done through the estimation of investment-cash
ﬂow sensitivity, where there is debate as to the tenability of the standard ap-
proach of sample separation. We identify theoretical ﬂaws in the critique and
also question its validity with respect to transition economies, and therefore
proceed in a conventional manner. We ﬁnd evidence to suggest that capital
markets are constraining the investment decisions of ﬁrms in all sub-samples
with the exception of privatised ﬁrms in Romania. We interpret this as a
failure to impose hard budget constraints on these ﬁrms, but the existence of
alternative explanations for this result highlights the need for further analy-
sis.
2 Theoretical considerations
The ﬂexible accelerator model was developed in response to evidence that the
ﬁrm may not fully adjust to the new optimal level of capital stock, K∗
t , due
to reasons of excess capacity or incomplete adjustment through delivery lags
on capital goods or uncertainty on the future level of demand. Chenery [2]
and Koyck [3] derived more complex processes for how the ﬁrm may proceed
along a path described by a single parameter of adjustment. These processes
did not, however, explain the determination of the adjustment parameter,
leaving it instead as a closed box. The crucial ﬂaw in this approach is that
variables that are postulated to inﬂuence the new optimal level of the capital
stock are themselves a function of the adjustment mechanism, and as such
should be included within the parametrisation of the adjustment process.
The Jorgenson extension to the ﬂexible accelerator made some progress
in addressing the neoclassical criticisms of the framework by introducing the
user cost of capital but the questions of delivery lags and adjustment costs
are omitted, allowing the multiperiod optimisation problem to become a
static one. The most prevalent methods in current research, the q and Euler
equation approaches, stem from the same base model of intertemporal proﬁt
maximisation as the neoclassical accelerator, but make assumptions about
the dynamics resulting from expectations, and are therefore less subject to
the Lucas critique.
The q-model uses information from ﬁnancial markets to construct the ra-
t i oo ft h em a r k e tv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm to the book value of its capital stock as a
2proxy for the true (unobservable) variable describing investment expenditure;
the ratio of the discounted future income stream from an additional unit of
capital to its purchase price1. Hayashi [4] derives the conditions under which
this approximation can be made2, and yet the empirical estimates have gen-
erally been unsatisfactory, where they have had low explanatory power and
have yielded implausibly high estimates of adjustment cost parameters. A
problem with the application of q-models is that many ﬁrms are not publicly
traded and therefore marginal q is unobservable, compounded in the tran-
sition context by trading being too thin to provide reliable estimates in the
small proportion of ﬁrms for which a market does exist.
The Euler equation approach avoids the problems inherent in the use
of ﬁnancial information by formulating the model in terms of the path of
optimal investment. Using the ﬁrst-order conditions of the same maximisa-
tion problem as moment conditions, and lagged variables as instruments, the
model can be estimated by GMM. This method has provided more reason-
able parameter estimates than have q-models, but its application remains
fraught partially due to the poor small-sample properties of GMM and sen-
sitivity to misspeciﬁcation. A particular diﬃculty with the identiﬁcation of
diﬀering ﬁnancial regimes using Euler equations is that they impose only a
period-to-period restriction, and therefore fail to detect restrictions that are
approximately constant over time. Therefore if the ﬁrm is no more ﬁnancially
constrained at the current time than it expects to be in the future it will not
be identiﬁed as ﬁnancially constrained, although if a sample is large enough
for reliable estimation by GMM this problem is likely to be mitigated.
The assumption of convex adjustment costs is critical within this class
of models. Caballero and Leahy [6] show that, once non-convex costs are
introduced into the model, q is no longer a positive monotonic function of
investment, and is therefore not a suﬃcient statistic for investment3.I nt h e
Euler equation framework the introduction of non-convex adjustment costs
results in the ﬁrst-order conditions no longer being expressed in terms of
observables, reducing the ease of estimation. In the next section we review
the literature on convex versus non-convex adjustment costs, and introduce
an alternative model, developed by Abel and Eberly.
1Commonly referred to as average and marginal q respectively.
2These conditions are product and factor market competition, linearly homogeneous
production and installation functions, homogeneous capital and independence of invest-
ment and ﬁnancing decisions. The eﬀect of relaxation of these assumptions has been
documented in Chirinko[5].
3Under certain assumptions average q can be used under non-convex costs, although
these same assumptions suggest the use of sales or proﬁts.
32.1 The nature of adjustment costs
2.1.1 Convex adjustment costs
Eisner and Strotz [7] introduced the idea that partial adjustment may not be
ar e s u l to ft h er e l a t i v eﬁxity of factors but rather that the ﬁrm experiences
some cost of adjustment, which is increasing in the speed of the expansion
or contraction undertaken. When the ﬁrm is a major buyer of the product
of its capital-supplying industry it faces an upwards-sloping supply curve in
the short-run, where this eﬀect is reinforced by internal costs of adjustment
as a result of lost production, reorganisation, training and suchlike. Gould
[8] disagrees with this form on the basis that the purchasing price of capital
goods would be independent of whether the investment was for purposes of
expansion or replacing depreciated capital, such that the adjustment cost
should be a function of gross rather than net investment. Although this
is less so the case for internal adjustment costs, the paper argues that this
formulation is superior because it imposes some cost of investment even if
the ﬁrm is not expanding its capital stock4. As Lucas [9] points out the
implication of convex adjustment costs for expansionary investment is that
the ﬁrm will stagger investment over periods, similar to the predictions of
incomplete adjustment in the ﬂexible accelerator formulation.
2.1.2 Irreversibility and ﬁxed costs
The cost function need not be symmetric and convex as postulated by Eisner
and Strotz, but characterised by signiﬁcant non-convexities as a result of
irreversibilities or ﬁxed costs of investment. As Chirinko argues[5, p. 1885]
”(w)ith linear or concave adjustment costs, the ﬁrm would
have an all-or-nothing investment policy. Convexity forces the
ﬁrm to think seriously about the future, as too rapid accumula-
tion of capital will prove costly.”
However, the combination of non-zero costs at zero investment with asym-
metry around that point removes the ”all-or-nothing” option and introduces
friction into the model, where the time path of investment is no longer smooth
but exhibits periods of activity and inactivity.
It is evident that some contraction in the capital stock is costless, namely
that resulting from depreciation, but contraction over and above this value
may be subject to high costs. This may occur where no secondary market is
4Chirinko [5] also notes that the external adjustment cost provides the more plausible
explanation for the assumption of convexity.
4existent, such as under asset speciﬁcity to a particular supply linkage, or in a
weaker form through a ’lemons’ eﬀect resulting from asymmetric information,
such that the value of the capital good is signiﬁcantly discounted in the
secondary market5.
There may also be costs associated with investment that are independent
of the size and speed of the adjustment undertaken, creating some ﬁxed cost
of adjustment. These costs, which are internal to the ﬁrm, will be generated
by the same processes such as lost production or the costs of reorganisation
that create the convex costs internal to the ﬁrm, where it is arguably too
strong an assumption that these costs should be strictly convex to the rate
of investment undertaken.
2.1.3 Empirical evidence
There is a considerable body of evidence on the nature of adjustment costs,
the majority of which has evaluated the ﬁt between observed behaviour and
that predicted by a particular cost function. The diﬃculty remains that
these costs are unobservable and therefore their study can only be under-
taken indirectly through the dynamics of the investment process. As ad-
dressed previously, a major result of convex adjustment costs is that ﬁrms
will undertake ’investment smoothing’ behaviour, but the evidence for this
is debatable. Doms and Dunne [10] found, using a balanced panel of plants,
periods of high investment activity directly followed by periods of zero in-
vestment, a result at odds with the prediction of smoothing behaviour. They
show that, of total plant investment in a fourteen year period, over half of
plants sampled adjusted their capital stock by at least 37% of this total in
one single year, and by over 50% in two consecutive years. This should be
contrasted with the ﬁnding that 45% of total investment in the sample is as
a result of some 80% of ﬁrms undertaking capital adjustments of less than
10% of capital stock.
The absence of smoothing behaviour indicated by this study is further
conﬁrmed by Nilsen and Schiantarelli [11], who use an unbalanced panel of
Norwegian ﬁrms and plants to examine the ’lumpiness’ of investment and
the incidence of periods of zero investment. They ﬁnd that the distribution
is best characterised by a high peak at zero, with a long, fat tail to the
right. This is inconsistent with investment smoothing behaviour not only
due to the mode at zero but also due to the presence of high levels of capital
adjustment represented by the tail of the distribution. Their estimates of
a hazard function for investment show that investment is most likely in the
5The failure of the neo-classical assumption of eﬃcient secondary markets is all the
more likely in the transition context.
5period subsequent to another investment (probability of 39.7%), but that it
declines rapidly in the following period, rising steadily to a peak at duration
period 9 (39.9%). The interpretation of these results, with which they advise
caution, is that there is some persistence of investment over periods as a
result of convex adjustment costs, but that the swift decline of the hazard
function and subsequent ’J’ form indicate the importance of ﬁxed costs in
t h es a m p l eo b s e r v a t i o n s .
Industry-wide studies cited in Cooper and Haltiwanger [12] found mixed
evidence, where quadratic adjustment costs were a suitable approximation for
some costs such as hiring and layoﬀ, inventory, overtime and machine setup
costs. In this paper, the authors specify a model of capital adjustment in
which both convex and non-convex costs are nested, and then using indirect
inference procedures on a large, plant-level panel they estimate the underly-
ing structural parameters of the adjustment cost function. They too ﬁnd that
the convex adjustment cost model cannot replicate the periods of inactivity
present in their sample, and that it is also unable to explain the observed
non-linear, asymmetric relationship between investment and proﬁtability6.
Evidence is found in favour of the non-convex models which replicate the ’ze-
roes and lumps’ nature of investment activity, and that irreversibilities can
explain the asymmetry of the investment-proﬁt linkage. They conclude that
at plant-level the convex adjustment cost model performs poorly7, although
they ﬁnd that at the aggregate level non-convexities are less important.
2.2 Capacity utilisation
Although the inclusion of capacity utilisation is ubiquitous in macroeconomic
models of investment, at the ﬁrm level it is a variable that has largely been
ignored. This may be a result of the diﬃculty of interpreting utilisation rates,
where the question of what the boundary case of 100% actually represents
is complex, such that signiﬁcant measurement error may be present in the
variable. It will also be inﬂuenced by the infrequent reporting of actual
capacity utilisation rates, where often a KLEM model is used to estimate the
utilisation rate on the assumption that it is proportional to the consumption
of a factor input, commonly electricity usage.
Chenery, in order to explain the observed occurrence of partial adjustment
in the accelerator model, developed a model using the informational content
of capacity utilisation rates. He assumes that there are two types of ﬁxed
6This non-linearity is also found by Barnett and Sakellaris [13] who identify three
regimes in the responsiveness of investment to changes in average q.
7Koeva [14] ﬁnds that at plant-level the omission of time-to-build considerations will
lead to overestimation of the convexity of adjustment costs.
6capital; one of which is large and indivisible with respect to the production
process, the other not. Under this assumption it is optimal for a ﬁrm to
operate at some level of overcapacity in the indivisible type of capital in
order to be able to vary the other in response to ﬂuctuations in demand,
thereby minimising costs and avoiding being constrained by delivery lags
and time-to-build factors. If the level of current output is produced at a
higher than optimal level of utilisation the ﬁrm will invest, where the rate at
which it does so is determined by a parameter describing the expectations
on the change in output that created the increase in the utilisation rate.
He found that the model of ’optimal overcapacity’, had greatest explanatory
power in those industries where the accelerator model had least, suggesting
a linkage between capacity utilisation and investment rates.
2.2.1 A model of investment incorporating capacity utilisation
rates
Abel and Eberly [1] derive a model of investment where the ﬁrm optimally
chooses the timing and rate of investment, where doing so incurs adjustment
costs in the form of ﬁxed costs and irreversibilities. In between these periods
of investment activity the ﬁrm is able to costlessly adjust the utilisation rate
of the factors in response to underlying stochastic state variables, and is
also able to adjust the level of the ﬂexible factor, labour. As a result the
length of the Marshallian short run, where the ﬁrm does not alter its capital
stock except through depreciation, is endogenous and a function of the state
variables and capital adjustment costs, and may not exhibit the persistence
of the convex adjustment cost models8.
We assume a proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm, operating a market with a downwards-







This demand curve is subject to a shock, X1, which evolves according to
geometric Brownian motion. The ﬁrm produces output, Q,u s i n gt w of a c t o r s
of production, capital, K, and labour, L, where it chooses how much of each
to employ, as well as a common utilisation rate, u.W e a s s u m e a C o b b -
Douglas production function, subject to a productivity shock, X2,t h a ta l s o




α, 0 < ν ≤ α + β ≤ 1
8We only give an outline of the model because the full model is too complex to report
here, and therefore refer the reader to the original article.












> η ≥ 1,ρ ≥ 1




ω and m are the standardised unit operating costs of labour and capital
respectively, where both evolve according to geometric Brownian motion.
To determine proﬁt maximisation we combine these shocks and costs into a
single variable, which being a product of variables evolving according to gBm
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−r(ti−t) (p∆Kti + ZtiF)
!
where r is the discount rate, p the price of capital goods and ZtiF the
ﬁxed cost of adjustment that the ﬁrm pays for installing capital, where the
proportionality to the compound cost variable, Z,p r e v e n t st h i sc o s tf r o m
becoming either trivial or too large as Kt rises and falls. The value function
of the ﬁrm is homogeneous of degree one in Z and K, so the value function




where y is a suﬃcient statistic for the ﬁrm’s investment decision. The
ﬁrm does not undertake investment unless, through shocks in the system,
this state variable rises above a trigger value, b, when it returns the state
variable to a target value, c, where these values are determined by the costs








8where Q∗ is capacity output9 and b the trigger value, is a positive monotonic
function of the state variable, y, and therefore must also be a suﬃcient statis-
tic for the investment decision. The implication of this result is that we can
formulate an investment equation where capacity utilisation is included as
an explanatory variable based on a model with explicit adjustment dynamics
in the optimisation problem, rather than the Chenery model which assumes
an unexplained adjustment parameter.
2.3 Financing constraints
A major and consistent result of studies into ﬁrms in transition economies
is the importance of ﬁnance for restructuring and subsequent performance.
Recent surveys have shown that the availability of external ﬁnance continues
to constrain ﬁrms, dampening investment levels and suppressing performance
[15]. EBRD indicators suggest that the development of the ﬁnancial sector in
both transition countries included in the dataset used in this paper is above
average for transition countries as a whole, although we expect some level of
constraint to exist, with diﬀerentials both intranationally and internationally.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fi n t e r n a lc a s hﬂow for determining investment behav-
iour was already identiﬁed by Tinbergen [16], although he found little evi-
dence to support his intuition. This was later taken on by Kuh [17], who
developed a liquidity accelerator model, and later variations on this theme
were more successful10.M u c ho ft h i ss t r a n do ft h e o r yw a sb a s e do ni n t u i t i o n ,
without the formulation of a base model. However a link can be made be-
tween these early forays and the hierarchy of ﬁnance models, e.g. Myers and
Majluf 11. Kuh’s model illustrates one of the diﬃculties in the assessment of
the presence of ﬁnancing constraints, because he shows that an accelerator
where cash ﬂow is the only independent variable included has power in ex-
plaining the level of investment undertaken, and is therefore an indicator of
the existence of an investment opportunity for ﬁrms. As a result, for diﬀer-
9The deﬁnition of capacity output in this model requires clariﬁcation in that it is
the greatest level of output that can be produced with the current capital stock without
triggering investment.
10Eisner[18] found that the level of internal funds was strongly signiﬁcant for the timing
of investment, but not its magnitude.
11If the Modigliani-Miller result does not hold (commonly used reasons are taxation
or the presence of capital market imperfections such as transaction costs) then there will
be a diﬀerential between the cost of internal and external ﬁnance, and also between the
cost of debt and equity ﬁnance through the presence of information asymmetries. It is
argued therefore that there should be a link between the ﬁnancial structure of a ﬁrm and
its investment decision, where the cheaper the ﬁnance available the more investment will
be undertaken due to the lower required rate of return.
9ences in coeﬃcients on the cash ﬂow variable to accurately identify varying
access to external ﬁnance the variable intended must control for the eﬀect
of investment opportunities, and with minimal variance in its explanatory
power across ﬁrms12.
There is considerable debate currently on the question of investment-cash
ﬂow sensitivity, and the article by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [21] is
generally considered to be the root of current microeconomic research. They
introduced the approach of separating the sample into groups based on a
priori beliefs on the level of constraints. They based their priors on the level
of the dividend payment, where they argue that the payment of low dividends
(in 67% of the sub-sample zero dividends) indicates a high rate of retained
earnings so as to ﬁnance investment, where this cannot be done by other
sources. This approach is problematic, in that it contradicts the results of
Lintner [22] who found considerable ’stickiness’ in the level of dividends paid,
such that this separation would be a result of historic preferences, and may
be country-speciﬁc [23] or time-speciﬁc13. However, they ﬁnd evidence that
those ﬁrms paying low dividends experience substantially greater sensitivity
of investment to cash ﬂow, where this result is robust across all investment
function speciﬁcations which they estimated14.
This result is, however, disputed by Kaplan and Zingales [24], who use
the same sample of ﬁrms but diﬀerent separation criteria to reverse the pre-
viously reported result. The crux of the Kaplan-Zingales critique is that the
assessment of ﬁnancing constraints through the estimation of investment-cash
ﬂow sensitivities makes the assumption that this sensitivity should increase
monotonically with the level of constraint. They originally showed in their
1997 paper how exceptions to this may exist, basing their argument on the
strong, and in our view unrealistic, assumption that the gradient of the mar-
ginal cost schedule for external ﬁnance is common across all ﬁrms. Their 2000
paper [25] goes further to hypothesize that the marginal cost is decreasing
in the volume of external ﬁnancing, citing evidence from Staﬀord [26]. This
result contrasts strongly with the hierarchy of ﬁnance literature (in which ﬁ-
nance raised externally is minimised because of the increasing marginal cost)
12Furthermore the cash-ﬂow variable must be lagged so as to avoid possible problems
of endogeneity. See Schiantarelli [19] and Chirinko and Schaller [20] for a comprehensive
review of articles and associated diﬃculties.
13In the recent U.S. bull market, rather than semi-permanent increases in dividends,
ﬁrms generally opted for share buybacks or mergers and acquisitions to transfer wealth to
shareholders.
14They estimated across the triumvirate of investment functions: accelerator, neoclas-
sical and q functions. It should be noted that the t-statistic is consistently higher for
estimation of q-models, suggesting that the control for investment opportunities is supe-
rior in this class of models to the other two.
10and is described by the target-adjustment theory, in which ﬁrms, once they
overcome the ﬁxed transaction costs of raising external ﬁnance, use it as a
means to increase working capital to a speciﬁc target, as opposed to minimis-
ing the volume raised. The implication of this decreasing marginal cost of
external ﬁnance is that investment activity will be constrained by the value
of internal cash ﬂow only up to the point at which external funds must be
sought, such that investment and cash ﬂow sensitivity could be either pos-
itively or negatively related. However the evidence from Staﬀo r di nf a v o u r
of the target-adjustment model is based on a particular sub-sample of in-
vesting ﬁrms; those Value Line ﬁrms undertaking extraordinary investments.
As Staﬀord himself concludes ”to the extent that Value Line ﬁrms are rela-
tively free of informational asymmetries, it seems unlikely that these can be
the driving force of their ﬁnancial policies”. Therefore the applicability of
this result to the study of diﬀerential ﬁnancing constraints generated through
asymmetry is debatable because Staﬀord selects his sample so as to minimise
this possibility.
This result may also be less applicable to the transition economies where
the lower stage of development of capital markets would be expected to have
an eﬀect. In the sample used by Staﬀord 89.2% of external ﬁnance was raised
through debt issuance and 10.8% through equity issuance. This result cannot
be replicated in transition economies where corporate debt markets are too
thin to raise signiﬁcant capital, such that the major component of external
ﬁnance continues to be bank-based. In this case the standard result of a
rising marginal cost of external ﬁnance, due to increasing risk of bankruptcy
and moral hazard problems, would provide a more realistic model. Further-
more, within the context of Staﬀord’s rationale, the level of informational
asymmetries and structural impediments would be signiﬁcantly greater
In this paper we expect ﬁrstly that the availability of external ﬁnance
will vary across countries, where Spain will have the lowest cost access. The
greater development of ﬁnancial markets in Poland than in Romania [27]
would be expected to result in a lower investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity in
Poland as a result of lesser informational asymmetries, although it is clear
that the possible extension of preferential rates in the less developed market
may reverse this result. We also hypothesize that ownership of the ﬁrm
will be a determining factor in access to external ﬁnance15, where we expect
state-owned ﬁrms to experience a lower or ﬂatter cost schedule as a result of
reduced risk of bankruptcy or lesser information asymmetries16.P r i v a t i s e d
15This approach has been common in the study of investment in transition countries,
applied amongst others by Lizal and Svejnar [28] and Anderson and Kegels [29].
16This may result either from size eﬀects of the extension of soft budget constraints.
11ﬁrms may be able to raise external ﬁnance at a lower cost than ab initio
ﬁrms as a result of reduced information asymmetries through having a longer
period of incorporation and relations with banks, but this beneﬁtm a yb e
counteracted by doubts about the political independence of decision-making
by the privatised enterprise.
2.4 Model choice
The estimation of an accelerator model remains common in transition liter-
ature because of the previously described diﬃculties associated with q and
Euler equation models. Not all attempts to identify an accelerator mecha-
nism in transition have been successful however, where Anderson and Kegels
[29] only ﬁnd evidence to support a Kuh-type cash ﬂow-accelerator. As
Bratkowski, Grosfeld and Rostowski [30] argue past production may not be
a good indicator of the future proﬁtability of investment under volatile de-
mand conditions such as those of transition, and therefore a sales accelerator
may not control with any precision for the presence of investment opportu-
nities.
The Abel and Eberly model does however provide an alternative, and one
which both explicitly models the adjustment mechanism and the taking of
expectations, and as such is a model more in keeping with current trends in
the modelling of investment behaviour. It also has certain departures from
the accelerator, which we show with two simple examples17. If we assume that
the environment described by the Abel and Eberly model is representative
of the ”true” world:
• For a ﬁrm experiencing positive demand shocks, both the rate of ca-
pacity utilisation and the value of sales variable will increase. Under
the accelerator formulation investment will occur because of the pos-
itive change in sales, whereas in the ”true” world the magnitude of
the positive demand shock may not be suﬃcient to induce the ﬁrm to
undertake investment because the trigger value is not exceeded.
• If in a particular period the ﬁrm is not subject to any exogenous demand
shocks the capital stock reduces through depreciation. To provide the
same ﬂow of capital services the utilisation rate of the capital stock
must rise, but since the cost of capital services is an increasing function
of the utilisation rate, the cost of this capital ﬂow rises. The shift in the
cost schedule for a proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm in a market with a downwards
sloping demand curve results in a fall in the level of output, where since
17For expositional simplicity we ignore the presence of productivity shocks.
12ε > 1 the value of sales will fall. Therefore the neoclassical accelerator
will predict disinvestment, but actually inactivity will result until the
capital stock has depreciated to the point that capacity utilisation is
equal to the trigger value, at which point investment occurs.
In the ﬁrst example the accelerator does not account for the hysteresis
of investment that is generated through the presence of non-convex costs of
adjustment, but in the second the two models imply, at the point when ad-
justment does occur, opposite eﬀects on the level of investment expenditure.
The inclusion of capacity utilisation as a regressor in investment estimations
should therefore provide more information than an accelerator term.
3 Methodology
3.1 Distributional assumptions
We have shown above that the state variable, y, is a linear function of the
aggregate price and shock variable, Z, which evolves according to geometric
Brownian motion and a constant, the capital stock. Therefore y should share
the same distribution as Z, which is lognormally distributed. Since capacity
utilisation is a non-linear function of y we cannot make as direct a link, but
instead make the ﬁrst-order approximation that it is normally distributed.
According to the theory, investment must be a positive monotonic func-
tion of capacity utilisation because the higher the utilisation rate, the further
the ﬁrm will be from the target value to which it returns the state variable.
Therefore we make a second approximation that it too is normally distributed
at values superior to the trigger value. This normal distribution is truncated
at κ,w h e r eκ is just greater than zero, because gross investment can only
take non-negative values. Firms for whom the shock or change in costs de-
scribed by Z is negative or insuﬃciently positive to take it above the trigger
value are observed to undertake zero gross investment, the probability of
which is described by a jump function. The theoretical model predicts that
this probability will be declining in capacity utilisation, because as capacity
utilisation rises each ﬁrm will be ex ante closer to its trigger value, such that
a smaller shock is required to take it outside the zone of inactivity. There-
fore we estimate the model using a mixed distribution composed of a single
probability of observing zero investment and a normal distribution for ﬁrms
undertaking positive values of investment.
133.2 Estimation procedure
The Tobit is also a mixed model composed of a discrete and a continuous
distribution which imposes the constraint that the regressors and coeﬃcients
of both distributions are the same. The model outlined above suggests that
capacity utilisation should be an explanatory variable in both distributions,
b u tt h a ts i m p l i ﬁcation that the response of investment to changes in capacity
utilisation is linear may be too restrictive. We therefore use a more general
model where the coeﬃcients may be diﬀerent for the ﬁrms undertaking in-
vestment activity from those which do not, introducing a simple non-linearity
to the response function, making the extension suggested by Heckman that
there should be some selection process present. The Tobit II [31] model con-
sists of two main parts, a structural equation and an index equation The





1x1i + ε1i (1)
where y∗
i denotes desired investment rates and x1i the vector of exogenous
variables which we postulate determine the level of investment. The question





2x2i + ε2i (2)
where if d∗
i > 0 we observe investment rate yi,a n di fd∗
i ≤ 0 we observe
investment level yi =0 ,s u c ht h a tdi is a one-zero variable describing whether
investment occurs or not. The intuition of this model is that we have one
equation which describes whether a ﬁrm invests or not, and a second which, if
investment does occur, determines how much. We assume the errors (ε1i,ε2i)
to be bivariate normally distributed with expectations zero, variances σ2
1 and
1 respectively, and correlation coeﬃcient ρ.I f ρ =0the two decisions of
whether to invest and how much to invest are independent, and if ρ =1
we have a univariate distribution such that the two are eﬀectively the same
decision and no selection process is present. If this is the case, we then can




2x2i and ε1i = ε2i such that
the model simpliﬁes to a standard Tobit procedure.

























0 stands for the product of those i for which yi =0and
Q
1
for those where yi 6=0,a n dΦ the cumulative density function and φ the
probability distribution function respectively.
14However our use of gross investment rates adds a further complication
because it is censored at zero such that in estimating the index equation we
do not know whether a zero is a ”true” zero. Following Jones [32] we can
express the model as
y = y∗ = β
0
1x1i + ε1i if β
0
1x1i + ε1i > 0 and β
0
2x2i + ε2i > 0
=0 if β
0
1x1i + ε1i 6 0 and β
0
2x2i + ε2i > 0
or, β
0
1x1i + ε1i > 0 and β
0
2x2i + ε2i 6 0
or, β
0
1x1i + ε1i > 0 and β
0
2x2i + ε2i 6 0
where ”β
0
1x1i + ε1i 6 0 and β
0
2x2i + ε2i > 0” describes a zero as result of
censoring, and not due to the threshold, a ”false” zero. This model stems
from the Cragg [33] double-hurdle model, although it makes the extension
that the two error terms are dependent. The likelihood function for this
























The data used is the product of a European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development survey assessing the cost of progress towards EU accession for
a sample of approximately 200 ﬁrms in each of Poland, Romania and Spain,
where the last, a relatively low-income EU member, provides a benchmark for
performance. The dataset also contains information on the ﬁnancial status
and labour and capital stocks and ﬂows for the period 1995 through to 1997,
from which we isolate the variables needed for our investment equation.
Certain procedures have been followed to identify problem observations,
where this had led to reduction in the number of ﬁr m st o6 9 ,1 1 3a n d1 1 7
ﬁrms for Poland, Romania and Spain respectively. We have excluded ﬁrms
for which we do not have observations across all three time periods, or for
which we have missing values. The most signiﬁcant problem, however, is
that of inconsistency between reported investment and capital stock, where
in many cases either variable may be incorrect such that we cannot identify
the most likely error.
The major implication of this reduction in the number of observations in
the dataset is that it is no longer possible to estimate the investment equation
by sub-samples because they are too small for precise estimation. Therefore
15we pool the data, using country and ownership dummies to distinguish be-
tween the eﬀects on the diﬀerent sub-samples. It should be noted that Spain
is treated as a homogeneous group as regards ownership because almost all
ﬁrms are ab initio private ﬁrms, with the exception of two state-owned and
one privatised ﬁrm which we have excluded rather than attempting to control
for them.
An important choice made in this paper is to estimate the investment
function using gross investment as the dependent variable, where in preced-
ing papers either gross or net is used, oft e nt r e a t i n gt h et w oa si n t e r c h a n g e -
able. The diﬃculty in this approach is in the calculation of net investment:
when taken from balance sheet data as is often done it ignores the fact that
reported depreciation is, to all extents and purposes, a choice variable de-
termined by issues of taxation. Calculation through intertemporal changes
in the reported stock of capital are relatively stable in developed economies,
but where issues such as high inﬂation (in particular of producer prices) and
the vintage of capital stock are present the link between changes of stock and
the ﬂow of investment expenditure is more fraught. It is for these reasons
that we attempt to minimise these issues through the use of reported gross
investment.
A major problem associated with the estimation of investment equations
is the noise present in the data, where investment is a volatile process. Fur-
thermore the use of annual point estimates for investment is diﬃcult because
of a lag between the time of purchase and the operational inception of the
new capital. In order to reduce this eﬀect we smooth the data by using be-
tween estimates, constructed as the average of the observations for 1996 and
199718.I n t h e c a s e o f c a s h ﬂow where we require a lag due to reasons of
endogeneity, we use the one period lag of cash ﬂow in 199519.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Model structure
In order to facilitate estimation of the double-hurdle model we do not include
all variables in both the structural and the threshold equations, but make
identifying restrictions. According to the model being tested capacity util-
isation is both a determinant of the probability of undertaking investment
18All variables have been deﬂated by producer price indices, and are expressed in 1995
constant prices.
19We construct cash ﬂow by calculating EBITD (earnings before interest, tax and de-
preciation).
16activity and the level of investment if undertaken, and as such should be
present in both equations. We postulate that cash ﬂow should only have an
impact on the level of investment undertaken and not on whether there is
investment activity because if the ﬁrm has suﬃcient productive assets such
that it does not wish to invest, levels of internal ﬁnance will be of no conse-
quence. The eﬀect of insuﬃcient internal funds to ﬁnance desired investment
will be picked up by cash ﬂow variables included in the structural equation,
even where a ﬁrm that is so highly ﬁnancially constrained such that desired
investment is forced to zero20. This would suggest that the structural equa-
tion should contain both capacity utilisation and cash ﬂow, interacted with
ownership and country dummies, whereas the threshold equation includes
just capacity utilisation and the dummies21.
Using the likelihood function given above, we estimate a double-hurdle
procedure, ﬁnding support for our hypotheses. However numerical evaluation
of the model is complicated by singularity of the inverse Hessian, such that
we proceed with a more simple procedure.
4.1.1 Tobit II (or not Tobit II)
We initially specify the most general system, including all possible cash ﬂow
variables, so as to test our structural model, where the results are reported
in Appendix B. The sensitivity of the Tobit II process is well documented,
where it may fail to converge to correct values22, but more importantly in
this model is the problem of speciﬁcation of the threshold equation. Monte
Carlo simulations by Flood and Gråsjö [34] show that for a Tobit II data
generation process if the threshold equation is incorrectly speciﬁed through
the omission of variables, Tobit II estimation is biased and Tobit I performs
20This special case also requires the ﬁrm to have no stock of retained earnings as well
as negative cash-ﬂow in prior periods, such that it has no working capital.
21A further problem associated with previous estimation of the incidence of cash ﬂow
constraints in transition economies, most notably that of Anderson and Kegels [29], is the
interpretation of coeﬃcients across separate sub-samples. Using this methodology it is not
possible to draw comparisons because all else is not being held constant, such that we could,
and do, observe large variations in the coeﬃcients on other included variables across the
samples. We therefore apply a more restrictive form, seeking to identify whether speciﬁc
types of ﬁrm have cash ﬂow sensitivities signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the mean, rather than
the previous approach which actually tests for a cash ﬂow accelerator in sub-samples.
22The STATA R ° manuals report a failure to converge on a dataset generated by a
Heckman process.
17better because it excludes the misspeciﬁed equation23. Given these problems
in the estimation of the model, we must use caution when interpreting the
estimation results.
We ﬁnd support for our model incorporating capacity utilisation rates,
where it is signiﬁcant in both equations determining both the choice of
whether to invest or not and the level of investment observed if undertaken.
It should also be noted that the classical accelerator change-in-sales variable
is statistically insigniﬁcant in the threshold equation where we omit it from
further estimation, but is signiﬁcant in the structural equation24.T h i sd o e s
therefore suggest that the presence of a proﬁtable investment opportunity
is not fully controlled for by the use of capacity utilisation. We ﬁnd sup-
port for our hypothesis that the cash ﬂow should only impact the level of
investment undertaken and not the binary choice because the cash ﬂow vari-
able is insigniﬁcant in the threshold equation. We have also controlled for
the possibility that the ownership of ﬁrms will inﬂuence the likelihood that
they invest, but ﬁnd ownership dummies to be insigniﬁcant in the threshold
equation. We retain them, despite insigniﬁcance, in the structural equation
because of interactions with cash ﬂow. The signiﬁcance of country dummies
in explaining the binary decision to invest supports a hypothesis of high levels
of investment being undertaken in transition countries.
The estimated coeﬃcient on the inverse Mills ratio (λ)i ss i g n i ﬁcant, sup-
porting the existence of a selection process. In contrast to this, the reported
correlation coeﬃcient of the two error terms (ρ) is equal to one, i.e. they are
perfectly correlated. As addressed previously this implies that the decision
whether to invest is the same as that of how much to invest, and there-
fore can be described by a univariate distribution. However, the estimated
standard error of 5 x 10−16 on the corner solution for ρ suggests estimation
problems, such that we also model the system with the less sensitive Tobit I
procedure25.
23
Bias (%) Estimation procedure











25W h i c hi si ni t s e l fs u g g e s t e db yt h ec o r r e l a t i o nc o e ﬃcient being equal to one.
184.1.2 Tobit I
A standard Tobit model excludes the threshold equation, having the simpler
form of
yi = β
0xi + ui if yi > 0
yi =0 otherwise

















Heckman [35] shows that a result of ignoring the possibility of a selection
process is that variables that do not belong in the true structural equation
may appear signiﬁcant in the determination of the dependent variables if
their impact on the choice of whether to invest or not is not isolated. Given
that our best estimate of the determinants of the selection process are a
subset of those in the structural equation we retain the same independent
variables for Tobit I estimation as used in Tobit II estimation.
The results, reported in Appendix C, support the use of capacity utilisa-
tion as a proxy for the proﬁtability of investment activity, where it is highly
statistically signiﬁcant. The accelerator term is, however, no longer signiﬁ-
cant, such that we omit it from subsequent estimation. The strong, positive,
signiﬁcance of the dummies for Poland and Romania again show that in-
vestment levels are higher across the board in these countries as compared
to Spain, such that we interpret this as a result of the need to restructure.
However the possibility remains that we have omitted structural variables
common to transition countries from the estimation procedure, where their
eﬀect is incorporated into these constant terms. Furthermore we ﬁnd no ev-
idence to suggest that the form of ownership inﬂuences investment except
where interacted with cash ﬂow variables, the insigniﬁcance of the ownership
dummies suggesting that no particular group is more likely to undertake
investment.
4.2 Are ﬁrms ﬁnancially constrained?
We consistently ﬁnd that cash ﬂow is a signiﬁcant explanatory variable in
the level of investment undertaken. This can be interpreted as an indication
of the presence of a wedge between internal and external sources of ﬁnance,
and that ﬁrms are constrained in their access to external ﬁnance. However
we also remain aware of the possibility that this result indicates weakness in
controlling for investment opportunity.
19The results of Tobit II estimation broadly support our priors as to the
diﬀerentials in access to external ﬁnance across the sub-samples of ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd that all Romanian ﬁrms exhibit investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity,
which for state owned and privatised ﬁrms is greater than the mean, possibly
reﬂe c t i n gt h er e l a t i v ed e v e l o p m e n to fﬁnancial markets. Amongst Polish
ﬁrms, all of which exhibit investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity less than the mean,
state owned enterprises are the least constrained in their access to external
ﬁnance, possibly the result of preferential treatment. The result that Polish
privatised ﬁrms have greater investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity than ab initio
private ﬁrms is unanticipated, but may be a reﬂection of residual doubts
in ﬁnancial markets about the autonomy of these ﬁrms. Although Tobit I
estimation is less eﬀective in identifying diﬀerences across the sub-samples,
the results are qualitatively similar, with the notable exception of Romanian
privatised ﬁrms which is the only sub-sample with sensitivity statistically
diﬀerent from the mean. Where relative measures of ﬁnancing constraints
have remained the same for most categories, Romanian privatised ﬁrms are
less constrained than the mean, where previously the converse was the case.
Furthermore our ﬁnding that the remainder of the population of ﬁrms are
constrained also requires careful interpretation, where a number of diﬀerent
alternatives are possible. It may be that the case that these ﬁrms all ex-
perience similar conditions in external capital markets, but we suggest that
this is too strong a conclusion. We expect, for reasons of ﬁnancial market
development, that there may be diﬀerent eﬀects present in each country. It is
plausible that Spanish ﬁnancial markets operate more eﬀectively, such that
the result may be driven by poor quality ﬁrms in the Spanish sample which
are unable to raise external capital and are therefore constrained. It may
also be a reﬂection of the stock of capital present in the Spanish market,
where transition economies have been aided by signiﬁcant ﬂows of foreign
direct investment.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have used a population of ﬁrms from Poland, Romania and
Spain to test an alternative model of investment, which we have speciﬁed
using capacity utilisation rates. We show that this model performs better
than a standard accelerator formulation, where we ﬁnd under some estima-
tion procedures that a change-in-sales variable is insigniﬁcant. Although we
expect that a selection process is present in the model, where ﬁrms that do
n o ti n v e s ta r ed i ﬀerent from those that do, we have diﬃculty in estimat-
ing this eﬀect. We attribute this to possible misspeciﬁcation as well as to
20small sample size, and therefore replicate our estimation using a more robust
procedure. Further research into this model is clearly required to assess its
validity, where a dataset with larger samples and a greater time dimension
would add to our understanding, and this paper represents only a preliminary
exploration of the Abel and Eberly model.
In terms of applied results we ﬁnd that investment levels in the transi-
tion countries are signiﬁcantly higher than those observed in Spain, but are
unable to identify strong diﬀerences amongst ownership categories within
these countries. However, we do observe diﬀerences in sensitivity to internal
cash ﬂow where we have taken a pessimistic view, suggesting that there is
evidence that capital markets are not functioning adequately in transition
economies. This occurs where ab initio ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained by
lack of access to external ﬁnance and, we suspect, in a lack of discipline im-
posed on ﬁrms that are able to exercise positional power. Other studies on
this question by Lizal and Svejnar [28] and Anderson and Kegels [29] show
the importance of including further ﬁnancial variables such as ﬁrm payables
and receivables, where these inﬂuence both the speciﬁcation of the model and
the results with respect to the question of ﬁnancing constraints. We cannot
replicate this result and therefore suggest that these eﬀects should be taken
into account when interpreting the estimation, as well as the issues raised by
the Kaplan-Zingales critique before drawing signiﬁcant policy conclusions.
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25AD a t a
Variable Mean Standard deviation N
Gross investment .12071 .15978 299
Capacity utilisation 77.339 17.869 299
∆ sales -.01647 1.0485 299
Cash ﬂow−1 Full .33734 .45960 299
Spain .34937 .40272 117
Pol. ab ini. .43567 .60126 17
Pol. pri. .19689 .18207 36
Pol. soe. .33218 .57018 16
Rom. ab ini. .52031 .63734 37
Rom. pri. .30112 .50641 51










































Figure 1: Investment and capacity utilisation rates
26BT o b i t I I r e s u l t s
B.1 Full model
Equation Variable Coeﬃcient Standard error
Structural Cap. util. .00267*** .00062
∆Sales .02334 .01540
Cash ﬂow−1 Full .08367** .03666
Pol. ab ini. -.05703 .07653
Pol. pri. .02699 .03258
Pol. soe. -.09493** .04331
Rom. ab ini. -.01011 .03270
Rom. pri. .06928 .07685
Rom. soe. .10819*** .02754





Threshold Cap. util. .01394*** .00379
∆Sales -.03064 .18681
Cash ﬂow−1 .25555 .22638








*,**, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respec-
tively. Standard errors are Huber-White robust.
27B.2 Parsimonious model
Equation Variable Coeﬃcient Standard error
Structural Cap. util. .00313*** .00067
∆Sales .03025** .01250
Cash ﬂow−1 Full .04045*** .00247
Pol. ab ini. -.02181* .01140
Pol. pri. -.00646** .00265
Pol. soe. -.08072** .03337
Rom. ab ini. -.00837 .01287
Rom. pri. .12042** .06156
Rom. soe. .13332*** .01032












*, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respec-
tively. Standard errors are Huber-White robust.
28CT o b i t I r e s u l t s
C.1 Full model
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard error
Cap. util. .00271*** .00069
∆Sales .01104 .01185
Cash ﬂow−1 Full .11049*** .04165
Pol. ab ini. -.08108 .07811
Pol. pri. -.03081 .15364
Pol. soe. -.11090 .08504
Rom. ab ini. -.02775 .06079
Rom. pri. -.10299 .07231
Rom. soe. .09152 .11695





Standard error .17383 .00844
C.2 Parsimonious model
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard error
Cap. util. .00274*** .00069
Cash ﬂow−1 Full .11601*** .04130
Pol. ab ini. -.07990 .07822
Pol. pri. -.04239 .15342
Pol. soe. -.11260 .08516
Rom. ab ini. -.03328 .06063
Rom. pri. -.12692* .06780
Rom. soe. .07936 .11640





Standard error .17411 .00846
*, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respec-
tively.
29